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ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to compare the effectiveness of two political sys-
tems: liberal democracy and illiberal democracy in fighting the coronavirus pandemic. 
The analysis is based on the theoretical assumptions of non-Marxian historical mate-
rialism. In the first part of the article, I present the concept of ‘regulative credit” which 
has been introduced within the framework of this theory. In standard socio-political 
conditions, the growth of regulatory power is usually contested by citizens. However, 
in a situation of danger, when social order is undermined, citizens support the author-
ities’ extraordinary regulations. This social support, called regulative credit, lasts as 
long as the danger persists. In the next section, I briefly characterize liberal and illib-
eral democracies. In liberal democracy, there is a balance between different branches 
of power, and citizens share a socio-political consciousness of an individualistic type. 
In illiberal democracy, the executive branch of power – though democratically chosen 
– has an advantage over the two other kinds of power, and citizens share a socio-po-
litical consciousness of a collectivist type. Those differences result in diverse reac-
tions of the authorities to a situation of threat. The political authorities of an illiberal 
democracy usually react faster, in comparison with the political authorities in liberal 
democracies, that react slower. Also, the attitude of citizens toward the introduced 
restrictions vary. Societies of illiberal democracies are more self-disciplined and more 
willing to accept restrictions from above. Whereas societies of liberal democracies 
are more individualistic and less willing to accept limitations. In the fourth part of 
my paper, I analyze briefly the influence of the pandemic on globalization processes 
and on the relations between the EU and the nation states in Europe. In the summary 
(section five), I predict that the mass use of modern technologies to control social life 
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and strengthening of the sovereignty of nation states will be the two most important 
effects of the pandemic.
KEYWORDS: pandemic, coronavirus, COVID-19, liberal democracy, illiberal democra-
cy, globalization 
INTRODUCTION
At the turn of 2019 and 2020, China and, later on, other countries of the eastern Asia 
(Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Macau) experienced an epidemic of the 
coronavirus (COVID-19). After about three months of intense battle with the disease, 
the epidemic appears to be easing off in its former epicenter, China, where such re-
strictive protective measures such as rigid quarantine, a prohibition on unnecessary 
presence in public spaces, and a requirement to maintain a safe distance from other 
people were introduced. The European countries, which – initially, at least – appeared 
to be less enthusiastic about the introduction of severe restrictions of civil liberties to 
limit the spread of infections, are now the main locus of the disease. The differences 
are so visible that they have given rise to a discussion about the relationship between 
freedom and safety and about the advantages of illiberal systems, in which the author-
ities are much more effective at protecting their own citizens.
BETWEEN SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND ANTAGONISM 
Let us consider the issue at hand in the context of the theoretical assumptions of 
non-Marxian historical materialism (Nowak 1983; Nowak 1991). In this theory, polit-
ical authorities are a social minority which, having at its disposal the means of coer-
cion, expands its control over social life. The authorities may force citizens to under-
take certain actions or to prohibit some of them, with the use of violence or threats 
of violence. The level of power regulation in a society is shaped by the proportion 
between the actions undertaken voluntarily by its citizens and actions undertaken 
(or not undertaken) because of sanctions or the threat of sanctions. When the level 
of power regulation exceeds a threshold which is not accepted by the society, acts 
of civil disobedience appear (Nowak 1991: 33-37). Such a conflict between the au-
thorities and the civil society should not, however, be understood in too simplistic a 
manner. According to Nowak: “The authority performs certain integrative functions 
for  the society. Above all, it secures the minimum of social order, without which no 
society can exist” (Nowak 1991: 39). Certain regulations of selected aspects of social 
life are made in all citizens’ interest because the maintenance of social order increases 
the effectiveness of citizens’ voluntary and enforced actions. Therefore, the growth of 
power regulation will not always lead to social contestation.
Still, certain events in social life will disrupt such understood social order. For ex-
ample, various unfortuitous events: environmental (earthquakes, floods), biological 
(epidemics, crop failures), or social (terrorist attacks) increase the risk incumbent on 
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the undertaken actions and the level of unpredictability, which destroys social and 
cooperative ties. In the face of a threat, the introduction of extraordinary regulations 
– and sanctions for violations of those regulations – by the authorities is in the inter-
est of the whole society, so it does social unrest is not triggered. On the contrary, it in-
creases social support for the authorities. Thus civil society supports the government 
by giving it a regulative credit of sorts,1 for the duration of the crisis. Once the danger 
has passed, everything returns to normal, and citizens’ disobedience with regard to 
the authorities’ bureaucratic activity re-emerges.
In view of the reflections above, we can see that the authorities’ ‘regulative’ activity 
is a better solution than a passive approach. Importantly, the regulations should be 
introduced at the right time and in the right way. If they are implemented too ear-
ly, they will not gain the society’s acceptance, and they will be ignored. As regards 
the method of implementation, they should be introduced in steps and in a complex 
manner (Brzechczyn 2004: 303-304), to prevent their evasion by individuals who, for 
various reasons, do not want to act in the common interest and do not comply, for 
example, with the quarantine, the injunction to practice the ‘social distancing’, and 
similar restrictive rules. Such a way of introducing extraordinary regulations will also 
restrict the diffusion of the pandemic, so it is also more likely to be effective from the 
purely medical point of view.
LIBERAL AND ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY: AN ATTEMPT AT ANALYSIS
In order to compare the effectiveness between two mentioned in the title of this sec-
tion political systems, we must distinguish between liberal and so-called ‘illiberal’ 
democracy. The latter term is rather unfortunate because the prefix ‘il-’ suggests that 
this variety of democracy is based on a simple negation of individual freedom, the 
key value of liberalism. Meanwhile, in illiberal democracy (at least, in its European 
version), freedom is understood the way it was in the ancient and modern republican 
thought: as related to being responsible for the community and to acquiring a set of 
public virtues. However, we cannot simply replace the adjective ‘illiberal’ with the ad-
jective ‘republican’ or ‘communitarian’ because in the countries of the eastern Asia, 
collective socio-political consciousness is based on a different axiological foundation, 
namely, the social philosophy of Confucianism (Huntington 1996: 103-109; confu-
cianist-liberal philosophical exchange, see: Rogacz 2015: 82-86).
Every political system can be characterized at the level of political practice and at 
the level of ideals. According to Piotr Przybysz (1999: 134-136), comparisons between 
different political systems can be faulty or proper. An erroneous comparison occurs 
when we collate, for example, the practice of a given political system with the ideal 
of another political system. In a proper comparison, we should collate two political 
systems at the level of political practice or at the level of ideals.
This rule should also be applied to comparisons between liberal and illiberal de-
mocracies. Consequently, we can distinguish between the political practice of liberal 
1 The concept of ‘regulative credit’ referring to inter-social relations was first introduced in Brzechczyn 
(1993: 447, 449-450).
86 SOCIETY REGISTER 2020 / VOL. 4., NO. 2
democracy, the ideal of liberal democracy, the political practice of illiberal democracy, 
and the ideal of illiberal democracy. For a proper comparison, we should set together 
the ideological levels of liberal democracy and illiberal democracy or, alternatively, 
the political practices in the two systems. It would be erroneous to compare the ideal 
of liberal democracy with the practice of illiberal democracy or vice versa.
In both varieties of democracy, the authorities are elected by the citizens, and the 
division into the executive, legislature, and judicial branches is preserved. However, 
in liberal democracy, the influence of the executive branch is limited by the increas-
ing prerogatives of the judicial branch which can block the decisions of the execu-
tive branch if they violate the rights and interests of various minorities and identi-
ty groups. It is the courts that evaluate whether the rights have been violated; the 
evaluation is not the subject matter of the public debate the result of which is sealed 
in polling stations (Lilla 2016: 135–138). That practice limits the rule of the elect-
ed executive authorities who can only serve as neutral arbiters of various advocacy 
groups. Consequently, the political process in liberal democracy is characterized by a 
kind of proceduralism: political decisions are to be made solely by institutions which 
have appropriate competences, and they have to be compliant with the increasingly 
complex law. As a result, political leaders’ personal responsibility for their decisions 
is diluted, and the possibility of holding the leaders to account during the elections is 
limited (Antoszewski 2018: 57). On the ideological level, liberal democracies are based 
on individualist liberalism in which the very concept of common good is negated and 
individual rights and liberties have a priority over the communal interests.
In illiberal democracy, the executive branch gains greater power than the legislative 
and judicial branches (Antoszewski 2018: 59). In that variety of democracy, freedom 
is interconnected with the sense of responsibility for the community. The state is not 
a neutral arbiter but an active supporter of domestic entrepreneurship in the unequal 
rivalry with global corporations as well as of the cultural and historical identity of the 
society. The basis of a political process are decisions made by a political leader (or the 
leadership of the political party which has won in the elections), and that leader is the 
actor ultimately responsible for the results of those decisions, and who will be called 
to account for them at the next election. Illiberal democracies refer to a version of col-
lective ideology – they put an emphasis on communality and subjugating individual 
rights to the interest of the community.
CORONAVIRUS IN ILLIBERAL AND LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 
The adjectives ‘liberal’ and ‘illiberal’ primarily refer to social and political conscious-
ness. Meanwhile, in the eastern Asia, we can distinguish at least three main types of 
socio-political systems: post-communist, illiberal autocracies, and illiberal democra-
cies. One example of a post-communist country is China governed by the apparatus of 
Communist Party which, directly or indirectly controls the economy and culture  (for 
the structure of Chinese society in terms of non-Marxian historical materialism, see 
Rogacz 2016: 176-179). Singapore and Macau could be classified as illiberal autocra-
cies, and Taiwan and South Korea – as illiberal democracies. I will limit my analysis to 
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the examples of China and Taiwan.  
According to the media, the first case of the coronavirus disease was reported in 
China on November 17, 2019. However, the Chinese authorities initially ignored the 
threat and repressed those who tried to inform the public about the threat of a new 
epidemic (for instance, Li Wenliang, a physician from Wuhan and eight other per-
sons from the medical personnel). It was only on December 31, 2019 that the Chinese 
government notified the World Health Organization about the virus. In the first half 
of January 2020, the virus spread throughout China. That was facilitated by the cele-
bration of the Chinese New Year which traditionally attract tourists from around the 
world and during which the Chinese travel back to their families. The Chinese au-
thorities only ordered a lockdown in Wuhan, accompanied by a number of regulations 
supervised directly by the army, on January 23, 2020. As reported from China by Nich-
olas A. Christakis, the educational and cultural institutions were closed there, and the 
quarantine period was prolonged.2 Chinese municipal authorities only allowed one 
person per household to go out to do the shopping. The official regulations pertaining 
to the pandemic were very detailed, for example, only four people at a time could en-
ter a lift, and they had to stand in the four corners of the space. The safe distance rule 
was also followed in other public spaces, such as offices or bus and railway stations. 
Christakis ascribes the effectiveness of the Chinese anti-epidemic strategy to the au-
thoritarian rule and collective culture prevalent in that country.
During the first phase of the development of the epidemic, the Chinese rulers ig-
nored the new disease and censored the information about its spread. This was possi-
ble because of the social control held by the Communist Party of China, which is much 
greater in this state than in autocratic systems, not to mention the democratic ones. 
When the censorship of the information proved to be ineffective, the authorities took 
action against the pandemic. Still, contrary to the propagandist campaign carried out 
globally after the epidemic was halted, we could hardly see the Chinese reaction as 
exemplary in the face of the threat (Birrel 2020). Rather, the suppression of informa-
tion and the persistent cover up are reminiscent of the (dis)informative politics of the 
Soviet Union after the Chernobyl catastrophe.
By comparison, China’s neighbor Taiwan began mass control of people coming 
from Wuhan as early as December 31, 2019, and the authorities forbade travel between 
Taiwan and China at the end of January and the beginning of February (Lanier, Weyl 
2020; Shen 2020; Turecki 2020). The Taiwanese government introduced a ban on the 
export of surgical masks, and it ordered more of them from the private manufactures, 
which were able to produce 10 million pieces a day. Soldiers helped produce the masks, 
working on 62 additional production lines. A central epidemics command center was 
set up by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The center monitored the spread of the 
pandemic and informed the citizens about the current situation. Quarantined people 
were monitored electronically, with the use of their mobile phones. The authorities 
verified whether the people broke the rules and
2 The reporter illustrates his observations with photographs – they are available on his Twitter account 
(https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1237020518781460480.html; Retrieved March 16, 2020); also see 
Birrel 2020, Turecki 2020).
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ensured they did not leave their houses. The government rationed the protective 
masks, also by the use of electronic means. Every Taiwanese person could buy two 
masks a week for themselves and for their family members. In order to avoid leaving 
the house, they could make the purchase online. People who went out to a store could 
learn online about the availability of the masks in pharmacies. Moreover, a special In-
ternet platform was created, with maps of the areas with the quarantined and infected 
people. According to Jaron Lanier and E. Glen Weyl (2020), “the Taiwanese response, 
based on an ethos of broad digital participation and community-driven tool develop-
ment, was fast, precise, and democratic”.
European countries (Spain, Italy, France) where liberal democracies prevailed, ini-
tially took a different approach – they prioritized freedom over the safety of the whole 
population. The extreme version of such an attitude at the beginning of pandemic 
was represented by the British government. Patrick Vallance, Boris Johnson’s advisor, 
opined that a quarantine would be effective in the case of a pandemic but not the 
coronavirus which only had the characteristics of an epidemic. The low fatality rate 
means that most of the population can have a mild case of the disease (Łepkowski 
2020). According to Vallance, “about 60% is the sort of figure you need to get herd 
immunity” (“News” 2020). The British method, as noted by Łepkowski, has some dis-
advantages as it “indicates the conscious awareness that a per mille of British citizens 
will be sentenced to death for the purpose of the natural ‘immunization’ of the re-
maining people” (Łepkowski 2020). The groups with especially high risk of dying are 
those aged 70 and above more and people with suppressed – for various reasons – im-
munity. After a time, though, the British approach was modified, and restrictions sim-
ilar to those in other countries were introduced: schools, stores, cultural institutions, 
etc. were closed, and social distancing was encouraged, if not enforced.
What were the reasons for the differences between the actions of the authorities 
in the varieties of democracy (liberal and illiberal)? They could be explained with the 
concept of regulative credit. I assume that under the conditions of an increasing threat 
to social order, the phenomenon of regulative credit leads to greater support for ex-
traordinary regulations introduced by the authorities. The question arises, then, why 
the illiberal democracies of the east Asia usually introduced those regulations earlier 
than the liberal democracies of Western Europe. Those seemingly small differences in 
time had a significant impact on the course of the fight against the pandemic. They 
resulted from the different impact of regulative credit in the two types of democracy 
and from the position of political power in those political systems.
The executive branch in an illiberal democracy has a greater ability to introduce 
extraordinary regulations and sanctions. Moreover, it is also expected to assume re-
sponsibility for the members of society and to actively protect them. The action of the 
authorities is reinforced by a collectivistic type of socio-political consciousness. In 
illiberal democracy, then, the effect of regulative credit is present, which is strength-
ened by social discipline and by subordination to social order.
In liberal democracy, on the other hand, the executive branch is restricted by the 
legislature and the judiciary, as well as by a set of autonomous (‘apolitical’) institu-
tions and offices, which prolongs the decision-making process. Additionally, an indi-
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vidualist type of social and political consciousness weakens the influence of the effect 
of the regulative credit. The restrictions of freedom introduced by the authorities are 
not followed by the citizens as on such a scale as they are in illiberal democracies.
It is worth noting that the different reactions if the political authorities east Asian 
and European countries may in part be explained by SARS-1 epidemics that the Asian 
societies directly experienced in 2000/2003. Having gone through this experience al-
ready, the state authorities took the outbreak of the Covid-19 epidemic very seriously 
from the beginning (I owe this observation to Achim Siegel, see also: Pueyo 2020). 
However, in order to take into account the influence of past events on the behavior 
of different political systems, we should introduce to our analysis the mechanism of 
social learning. In case of a political system, social learning contains at least two di-
mensions: diagnosis of the given state of affairs (e.g. efficiency of health system) and 
practical recommendation of changes/reforms. Because the decision-making  process 
in liberal democracies is usually much more diffuse than in illiberal democracies (not 
mention autocracies), this second type of political system is able to learn from past 
experience in a more effective way and introduce more rigidly desirable reforms and 
procedures.
NATION STATES IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD
Faced with the pandemic, we re-examine the issue of globalization and the role of the 
sovereignty of particular states. In David Goodhart’s (2020) words:
We no longer need the help of rats or fleas to spread disease — we can do it 
ourselves thanks to mass international travel and supply chains. And we are no 
longer self-sufficient when things go wrong. When a corona vaccine is eventually 
discovered, we will have to wait our turn in the queue as we no longer have a UK-
based manufacturer. Talk of the need for de-globalisation seems suddenly to be 
everywhere.
We could assume that globalization processes have hitherto eroded the sovereign-
ty of nation states. Let us take a closer look at what sovereignty is, then. The power 
regulation of a state authorities can be divided into the internal (dependent solely on 
the authorities of the state) and external (dependent on various international agents) 
parts. The degree of dependence or sovereignty of a state can be evaluated on the 
basis of the relationship between the sphere of internal regulation and the sphere of 
general power regulation. The fraction which expresses the relation of the numerical 
sizes of those sets can be called the sovereignty ratio. If it equals one, then globaliza-
tion processes lead to the elimination of effective sovereignty (the state as a market) 
in favor of transnational organizations and institutions.  If it has a value in the range 
between 0 and 1, then globalization processes make the state dependent on external 
agents. For a sovereign state, the ratio is equal to zero (Brzechczyn 1993: 446).
The European Union was severely criticized, on the one hand, for confessing, 
through Ursula von der Leyen, that “we are all Italians,” whilst at the same time, for 
not being more proactive in the face of the Italian crisis. One decision made by the 
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authorities was to provide tens of billions of euros for counteracting the results of the 
epidemics but only came in March 2020. Particular states closed their borders, restrict-
ed air travel, and banned the export of medical equipment (such as masks, gloves, res-
pirators, and PPE) independently from one another.3 They also independently prepare 
assistance programs for domestic business.
It should be noted, though, that the transnational level is not optimal for deciding 
how to fight a pandemic in particular countries. First of all, the pandemic does is not 
spread equally throughout Europe. It would be not only difficult but also ineffective to 
introduce the same regulations, at the same pace and simultaneously, in Italy (tens of 
thousands of infected people, a few thousand deaths – as of March 2020) and in Lithu-
ania (tens of infected people, a few deaths). On the other hand, diversified regulations 
for particular European countries would unnecessarily prolong the decision-making 
process, and their belated implementation would be unsuccessful. It is easier to see 
what should be done in Italy or Lithuania from Rome or Vilnius, respectively, than 
from Brussels.
In other words, in this case, it would be more efficient to leave the decision making 
to the nation states and not to delegate it to transnational institutions, which will not 
be directly accountable for the decisions to voters in each country. That does not mean, 
however, that the authorities of nation states do not err or that they would choose a 
correct strategy (for example the United Kingdom). In such cases, the losses will be 
limited in scope to one society – which can hold the decision makers accountable on 
the occasion at the next elections. Having said that, the critique of excessive global-
ization does not entail approval for international isolation. Controlled globalization 
would be an optimal solution – with international aid and cooperation, necessary for 
minimizing the repercussions of natural catastrophes, coupled with a mechanism of 
learning on the part of the authorities of particular nation states. The presence of 
that mechanism, though, presupposes the existence of truly sovereign nation states 
and not of illusory states deprived, by globalization processes, of their power to make 
decisions.
CONCLUSIONS
It seems that once the epidemics is over, there will be social and political changes in 
at least three areas.
(i) Modern technology will still be used for constant and common monitoring 
of citizens’ behavior. After September 11, 2001, electronic surveillance was used 
against terrorism, with respect to a small percentage of citizens. We can rea-
sonably expect that after COVID-19, the electronic surveillance will be used en 
masse for monitoring the health of societies. 
(ii) The sovereignty and economic self-sufficiency of nation states will be 
3 It is worth noting that up to April 3, 2020, the same customs duties (around 6%) for the export of 
protective masks produced outside of the European Union was maintained (mail correspondence with 
Przemysław Szulgit, the president of the Management Board of the TSM POLAND SP. Z O.O. company). 
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strengthened. The coronavirus has revealed the fragility of globalization process-
es: in the conditions of developed international economic cooperation, breaks in 
the delivery of specialized parts and components in one part of the world can 
disrupt production processes in another part of the world. Moreover, in the face 
of a threat, certain nation states paid little or no attention to the international 
structures and organizations (the United Nations, the European Union), and in-
stead they effectively introduced protectionist policies in the areas of the pro-
duction and distribution of medical equipment, closed their borders, and created 
programs for overcoming the economic recession.  
 (iii) Modification of liberal democracy towards its illiberal counterpart. In order 
to combat the world economic crisis that is will surely be a consequence of pan-
demic, European states will have to introduce more interventionist economic 
policies. The domain of public health will become more important element of 
social safety, which will also include the supporting sectors of the economy and 
science. Those spheres of life will be excluded from the influence of the ongo-
ing political dispute and market mechanisms. However, they will be subjected to 
stricter regulation by the political authorities.
Obviously, we do not know how long those changes and tendencies will last and how 
strong they will be. It is worth recognizing that the current pandemic is the first global 
event directly experienced by people from all societies in the world.  Although, two 
world wars have fundamentally changed international relations and domestic order of 
many state policies, they did not have global character as understood above. First of 
all, military campaigns and Axis powers’ occupations did not affect all territories of 
the world. Secondly, some states remained neutral and their citizens did not take part 
in the war. Even the terrorist attack of 9/11 was globally observed only via tv screens 
all the world. By contrast the COVID-19 pandemic directly affects people coming from 
all societies in the world. It is too early, at this juncture, to speak about the rise of a 
new corona’s generation. First of all, the intensity of the pandemic varies from region 
to regions. Now, one can identify three its epicenters: China, Italy (or southern Eu-
rope), and the USA. Furthermore, according to sociological definition a generation is a 
group of people of this same age sharing common attitude and common hierarchy of 
ethical values resulting from this same historical experience (Ossowska 1963; Gare-
wicz 1983) that is usually immortalized in culture. 
However, above-mentioned social results of the pandemic will weaken the tendency 
(ii). The strength of this counter influence depends on social effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic.  If coronavirus pandemic contributed to the rise of new world generation, 
it would block tendency (ii) in stronger way. If, on the other hand, the pandemic re-
mains only the common global experience of the world population, its influence will 
be much weaker.
The world has seen greater pandemics: the plague of Justinian in the Byzantine 
Empire in the 6th century, the Black Death in Western Europe in the 14th century, or 
the 1918–1920 Spanish flu. They each had an impact on the life of one generation, but 
that influence decreased over time, and if they were not immortalized in culture and 
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the political praxis, they were gradually forgotten. History is a teacher of life on the 
condition that people and societies want to learn from it.  
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